Não é uma previsão, é algo que já está a acontecer.

 No DN de 27.12.2023 encontrei este artigo de opinião, "O retumbante sucesso do friendshoring americano":

"Na sequência de uma ordem executiva de 2021 do presidente dos EUA, instruindo a sua Administração a realizar uma revisão das principais cadeias de abastecimento dos EUA, a secretária do Tesouro dos EUA, falando no Atlantic Council, em abril de 2022, anunciou uma nova abordagem da Administração Biden para navegar numa economia global mais adversa a interesses americanos, chamando-a de friendshoring.

...

Esta nova política estado-unidense de busca de cadeias de abastecimento mais resilientes entre parceiros de confiança, através de friendshoring, tem um principal destinatário - a China e as empresas chinesas - e tem-se traduzido em iniciativas como a adoção do CHIPS and Science Act, que têm sido complementadas por outras como o US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), o Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), o Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), e a America's Partnership for Economic Prosperity, para "interagir com parceiros confiáveis" e "reduzir as dependências de fontes não-confiáveis de fornecimento estratégico".

...

No plano do comércio externo, o friendshoring aparenta ser um retumbante sucesso. Em menos de dois anos, o México e o Canadá (friendshoring+ nearshoring) ultrapassaram a China como principais fornecedores de bens dos EUA em cadeias de abastecimento diversificadas. As importações dos EUA da China caem 25% no primeiro semestre de 2023; desde 2019, o superavit comercial bilateral do México com os EUA aumentou 40%. A China é agora apenas o terceiro maior fornecedor dos EUA. De acordo com alguns, o aumento das importações dos países vizinhos e parceiros na NAFTA reflete mudanças na procura dos consumidores e na diversificação da cadeia de abastecimento liderada pela pandemia.

As estatísticas mostram também que as exportações chinesas para países que estão a subir no ranking de fontes de importação dos EUA estão a aumentar. O fenómeno não é inédito. Temos vindo a assistir ao desvio comercial de produtos ocidentais para a Rússia através da Ásia Central. A extraordinária coincidência de aumento de fluxos de exportações da China para o México e o Canadá e destes dois países para os EUA leva um articulista da Bloomberga sugerir que as empresas chinesas estão a redirecionar boa parte das suas exportações. Quando ficar claro em Washington que o brilhante plano de friendshoring gera redirecionamento de produtos exportados por empresas chinesas para os EUA via México (e Canadá), é bem possível que tal gere uma nova onda de reação protecionista americana."

Há exactamente uma semana, a diretora comercial de uma empresa de fabrico de máquinas, todas destinadas à exportação, contactou-me para discutir o seu excelente ano. Ela partilhou o sucesso crescente no mercado norte-americano. Recordando que os conheci quando exploravam a América Latina e Sul, inquiri sobre as vendas e presença em países como Chile, El Salvador e México. Ela revelou que um cliente mexicano lhe mencionou a intenção de abrir uma fábrica nos EUA, visando contornar a legislação americana que visa limitar importações do México, devido à recente instalação de empresas chinesas aproveitando a política mencionada no artigo.

Não é uma previsão, é algo que já está a acontecer.

Quem vai voltar a ser a China da UE? (parte II)

A propósito de “Quem vai voltar a ser a China da UE?”, mão amiga fez-me chegar um e-mail com um convite para este webinar:

Quem vai voltar a ser a China da UE?

"Schneider Electric, one of the world's largest makers of electrical and automation products, is shifting some manufacturing closer to the U.S. from factories in Asia and Europe as it pushes ahead with a regional manufacturing strategy.

The moves are meant to position the France-based company, which makes goods such as light switches, electric-vehicle chargers, home-automation systems and data-center equipment, to meet growing demand in North America and to compete for federal subsidies aimed at expanding manufacturing in the U.S.

…

The company said it has started working with North American suppliers and is encouraging some of its suppliers elsewhere to set up factories in the region as it builds a local supply chain for materials such as nickel and lithium.

The company said it makes more than 80% of the products it sells in the U.S., Mexico and Canada in North America, with the rest made in factories across China, India, Southeast Asia and Europe. It will continue manufacturing in Asia and Europe but aims to have the finished goods go to customers in those regions instead of shipping the products around the world.

…

The company is restructuring its supply chain at a time when many businesses are looking to bring manufacturing closer to the U.S. after disruptions, stockouts and shipping delays during the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the fragility of far-flung supply chains, said Kamala Raman, an analyst at research firm Gartner. Geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China have also prompted concerns from government and business officials about the national-security risks of manufacturing crucial and highly technical items such as semiconductors overseas”

Trechos retirados do WSJ no artigo "Schneider Electric Expands Its North American Manufacturing"

Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023

Recentemente escrevi, O choque chinês, não o euro. Agora, imaginem o impacte da reversão deste choque... por isso, tenho escrito esta série de postais - Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V).

Para reflexão:

"China’s days of being the Western world’s go-to manufacturing hub may be coming to an end. This has serious ramifications for China, and the world. Depending on where you focus, this is a good thing, or a bad thing. In fact, it’s probably both.

...

For those with contacts in China, stories of laid off young people struggling to afford their apartments, taking on two jobs in gig economies, or becoming escorts in karaoke bars is becoming commonplace. This is not the country that the CCP once held together with promise of opportunity and quick climbs up the Chinese social ladder. This is starting to turn into America of the late 1990s-2000s, reeling for China’s take over of American tooling and steel, textiles and furniture manufacturing. Many people here know what that feels like.

...

The problem is geopolitics. [Moi ici: Recordar Taiwan como espelho da Ucrânia - Cash, then value, then growth] That should scare China’s investors more. They know the drill already. Companies are slow walking out of China because of those tensions. This includes Chinese companies investing in Southeast Asia to avoid trade tariffs, sanctions, and growing political risk. [Moi ici: Recordar Lembram-se do "banhista gordo"?]

To keep its business with the Americans (and to a lesser extent, the Europeans) Chinese companies are moving off the mainland.

...

In a country with roughly 900 million workers, many of whom are blue collar and not about to “learn to code”, these job losses tear at the social contract between the CCP and its people. Roughly 17% of Chinese people have a college degree compared to around 36% in the U.S., according to Chinese and U.S. government stats.

...

Either China figures out a way to consume what it produces at home rather than relying on the U.S. consumer, [Moi ici: Eu pensei nisto em 2008. Recordo Especulação. No entanto, Peter Zaihan alerta-nos para o colapso demográfico chinês, O futuro da globalização. Só para ter uma ideia do impacte da coisa repito aqui o número tremendo "The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan"] or Beijing makes it less attractive for companies to set up shop in Vietnam. If they cannot do those things, the bloodletting will continue. If this trend goes on, it should be seen as a harbinger of worse things to come.

...

China used to make almost all of our clothes. Not anymore. That’s job losses for China.

...

U.S. imports of China made apparel decreased from about $25 billion in 2018 to about $17 billion in 2021, according to a March 2023 report by the International Trade Commission (ITC).

Imports of these goods from China declined but imports from the rest of the world grew by 25.2%. The ITC estimated a sizable decline in apparel manufacturing imports from China of 40% between 2020 and 2021, while U.S. production increased by up to 6.3% in 2021 in response.

The ITC study looked at 10 different sectors. In all 10, China exports to the U.S. fell. Computer equipment from China fell around 7%; furniture imports fell 25%; electronics equipment imports fell by 40%. Automotive parts imports fell a whopping 50%, according to the ITC.

...

China and Hong Kong’s investment into Mexico rose six-fold from $117.1 million in 2015 to nearly $700 million in 2022, according to the Mexican government.

Chinese manufacturing growth might have peaked.

China’s future growth industries could pick up some of this labor, but very little. Robotics will be good for China blue collar labor, but biotech, pharma, and AI will not as making the shift from seamstress to scientist is quite the stretch. So is going from Chinese solar panel maker to AI coder. It is also unlikely that lower skilled office jobs can pick up the blue collar workforce losing out to outsourcing.

...

China is surely not a dying manufacturing power. Europe would be in worse shape, for sure. China can turn the ship around, but if it comes at America’s expense, that will be totally unsustainable.

But China’s days as manufacturer of nearly everything in your house and garden shed look to be pretty much over. That’s a lot of workers whose future is in question for the first time in a generation.

...

the bad news is that the erosion of China’s role as go-to manufacturer will likely become a matter of life and death — for industries, for businesses, for some people."

Trechos retirados de "China's Big Troubles: Its Days As Global Go-To Manufacturer May Be Coming To An End"

"we realize that opportunity is all around us if we keep our mind open"

"Fico a pensar ...  Qual é, qual deve ser o papel de uma associação empresarial nesta teia de interesses conflituantes?"

Foi assim que terminei este postal, "Pergunta sincera, pergunta honesta". Entretanto, há dias neste outro postal, "Exportações, gansos, mastins e ... "amélias"" usámos os números do INE para ilustrar a evolução das exportações por causa do risco de trabalhar com a China, hoje e no futuro.

Ontem encontrei este artigo, "Supply chains are never returning to ‘normal’", escrito numa perspectiva norte-americana:

"The conventional wisdom at this time is that most of the world has moved on from the pandemic (except for China); therefore, supply chains will return to “normal.” Unfortunately, this is not the case. The world has permanently changed and supply chains are going to face continuing challenges for decades to come. Among those challenges are:

• Supply chains will remain under constant threat of disruption for the next decade
• Supply chains operate best when the world is peaceful and stable
• A smoothly running supply chain requires “buffer stock,” which is challenging with declining population demographics
• There is a conflict between environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals and supply chains optimized for cost and speed. If we prioritize ESG, we will need to contend with supply chain risks
• Supply chain technology will become the big venture capital category winner as companies continue to make investments in technologies that can help them mitigate their supply chain challenges

...

Cheap labor is becoming scarcer, particularly in Asia. This is largely due to aging populations – the average age continues to increase and there are fewer people to work in these manufacturing jobs.

...

Companies will look closer to home for product sourcing. They will prioritize production in countries that are far more stable and friendly to the United States."

O que é que as associações empresariais estão a fazer para tirar partido deste contexto? Ainda têm de fazer esta evolução "We start to see bridges". 

BTW, o artigo descreve a evolução em curso como decorrente destes eventos recentes, quem segue este blogue pode recordar este texto de Maio de 2020, ""El coronavirus actúa como acelerador de cambios que ya estaban en marcha"".

O risco de voltar a trabalhar com a China (parte IV)

Parte III, Parte II e parte I.

"The invasion of Ukraine by Russia and sanctions imposed on it for doing so and new pandemic-related shutdowns in China are the latest events to rock global supply chains. Combined with the China-U.S. trade war and other pandemic- and climate-related disruptions, it is certain to accelerate the movement by Western companies to reduce their dependency on China for components and finished goods and on Russia for transportation and raw materials and to lead to more localized, or regional, sourcing strategies. If China decides to back Russia in the Ukraine conflict, it would only fuel that movement.

...

In 2019, just before the pandemic, China accounted for 28.7% of global manufacturing output while the United States accounted for 16.8%

In the last four years, however, the China-U.S. trade war and the supply chain disruptions generated by the pandemic and climate-related events have caused the pace of supply-chain localization to rise significantly. In fact, a January 2020 survey of 3,000 firms, motivated by the China-U.S. trade war, found that companies in a variety of industries — including semiconductors, autos, and medical equipment — had shifted, or planned to shift, at least part off their supply chains from current locations. Companies in about half of all global sectors in North America declared an intent to “reshore.”

...

The Ukraine war and closer alignment of China and Russia will modify profoundly the exchange of energy, raw materials, industrial parts, and goods between the Western world, China, and Russia and promise to accelerate the reshoring trend."

Trechos retirados de "How the War in Ukraine Is Further Disrupting Global Supply Chains"

"hay que construir nuevas cadenas de aprovisionamiento regionalizadas” (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

O impacte destas restrições na aceleração da revolução que já estava em curso, traduzido no reshoring:

• Hong Kong pode ficar em confinamento até 2024
• Año nuevo chino: más tensión para el ‘sourcing’ y el consumo al ralentí

Isto vai provocar uma mudança abrupta no paradigma vigente. Que implicações serão sentidas? Como as poderemos aproveitar?

"hay que construir nuevas cadenas de aprovisionamiento regionalizadas” (parte II)

Part I 

"Splits are emerging in corporate America's response to a supply chain crisis which growing numbers of executives expect to last all year, heralding a wave of spending on new capacity, better data, and support for weaker vendors.

This earnings season, companies have complained of shortages, delays, and spiking costs in a quarter in which they scrambled to procure semiconductors, were left waiting for components and suffered the effects of suppliers' staffing gaps.

...

The pandemic has pushed manufacturers to redesign their supply chains in favor of certainty of supply and locating inventory closer to customers.

...

Companies including VF Corp, the clothing group behind The North Face, said they had moved some production to suppliers closer to their biggest markets.

...

Companies with more domestic suppliers and those that had moved before the pandemic o broaden their supply chains were faring better than others with more complex, global logistics, said Tim Ryan, chair of PwC US. mid-January survey of US executives by PwC found that less than half expected supply chain disruptions to ease by the end of the year, and more than 60 percent planned to raise prices in response.

...

“The engineers have designed supply chains around predictability and when that predictability goes away everything goes to hell in a handbasket,” he told the FT.

“Most companies are realising that they over-tuned their operation for performance versus resilience,”"

Trechos retirados "Winners and losers emerge from lingering US supply chain crisis"

"hay que construir nuevas cadenas de aprovisionamiento regionalizadas”

"La cadena de suministro sigue sumando costes. Las continuas interrupciones en la supply chain podrían suponer pérdidas de entre 9.000 millones de dólares y 17.000 millones de dólares en para la industria norteamericana de la confección y el calzado en 2022

...

En los últimos doce meses, entre los aumentos de costes que sufrieron los sectores de la confección y el calzado en Norteamérica se incluyen el incremento del precio del algodón, que aumentó en un 40%, el de los contenedores marítimos, que se disparó un 300%, el transporte aéreo, con un alza del 50%, y por carretera, que se incrementó en un 20%. 

Todo esto, sumado a la escasez de la mano de obra, repercutió en los salarios de los trabajadores de la logística, el almacenamiento y la venta al por menor, contribuyendo, aún más, a los gastos de todas las industrias en términos generales.

...

“Hay diversas prácticas que se pueden llevar a cabo para que las cadenas de suministro sean más resistentes”, señaló Brian Ehrig, socio de Kearney en Nueva York, en un comunicado. “Lo primero es poner el foco en aquellos aspectos que se pueden controlar como nuevas estrategias de aprovisionamiento y una gestión más rigurosa del inventario”, añadió Ehrig.

“A largo plazo, las empresas mejoran su capacidad de resistencia mediante la deslocalización; para que la cadena de suministro sea menos vulnerable, hay que construir nuevas cadenas de aprovisionamiento regionalizadas”, sostuvo. 

A su vez, la creación de plataformas para generar sinergias también podría generar un impacto positivo en la agilización de la supply chain de empresas de confección y calzado, especialmente reduciendo los costes de la cartera de productos cuando se produzca una interrupción en la cadena."

Trechos retirados de "Estados Unidos: las pérdidas por la rotura de la ‘supply chain’ podrían alcanzar 17.000 millones en 2022"

Era bom que se aproveitasse esta boleia ...

Recordo Emprego, preços e desglobalização

"A variante Ómicron pode tornar a China vítima do seu sucesso, à medida que a política de “zero covid” prolonga o isolamento do país, quando o resto do mundo vislumbra uma fase endémica para a doença, apontam analistas.

“Em 2022, a China vai enfrentar a altamente transmissível [variante] Ómicron, com vacinas aparentemente menos eficazes e muito menos pessoas protegidas por anticorpos criados por infeções anteriores”, observou a consultora de riscos políticos norte-americana Eurasia Group, num relatório.

As medidas de bloqueio para conter os surtos deverão ser ainda mais frequentes e duras, envolvendo dezenas de milhões de pessoas, lê-se no mesmo documento.

“Esta crise vai continuar até que a China possa lançar vacinas de RNA mensageiro desenvolvidas internamente e reforços para os seus 1,4 mil milhões de habitantes, o que ainda deve demorar pelo menos um ano”, acrescentou.

A política de zero casos implicou a suspensão das viagens de negócios e turismo ou intercâmbios académicos com o exterior.

Quem chega ao país tem que realizar uma quarentena cujo período varia entre duas e quatro semanas, dependendo da província de destino. As autoridades exigem ainda a apresentação do certificado negativo dos testes serológicos tipo IgG e IgM e o teste de ácido nucleico PCR antes do embarque."

Depois, queixem-se e chamem-me nomes por achar que anda muito optimismo mal justificado no ar. 

Era bom que se aproveitasse esta boleia para preparar a próxima etapa, antes que a maré mude outra vez.

Trecho retirado de "Ómicron deve deixar China mais isolada com insistência na política de zero casos"

Emprego, preços e desglobalização

Com o progresso da globalização veio o encerramento de muitas empresas em todo o mundo Ocidental, a chamada desindustrialização, por incapacidade de competir pelo preço com a China primeiro e a Ásia depois. Assim, com o progresso da globalização veio o aumento do desemprego no Ocidente por um lado, e a redução generalizada dos preços por outro.

Com a crise de 2008 começou a desglobalização, o aumento da importância do factor proximidade produção-consumo. Agora, com os confinamentos, com as quarentenas, com as cadeias de fornecimento pouco ágeis num mundo de incerteza... façamos uma inversão daquelas setas:

Os impactes da desglobalização serão:

• mais emprego; (falta de mão de obra) e
• preços mais altos (inflação)

Será que isto pode durar? Neste artigo da revista The Economist, "China’s economy looks especially vulnerable to the spread of Omicron" li:

"Since the end of May, China has recorded 7,728 covid-19 infections. America has recorded 15.2m. And yet China’s curbs on movement and gathering have been tighter, especially near outbreaks (see chart 1). Its policy of “zero tolerance” towards covid-19 also entails limited tolerance for international travel. It requires visitors to endure a quarantine of at least 14 days in an assigned hotel. The number of mainlanders crossing the border has dropped by 99%, according to Wind, a data provider.

...

Businesspeople in Shanghai have started talking about travel restrictions persisting until 2024. The virus is highly mutable. China’s policy towards it, however, is strikingly invariant."

 Acerca do emprego este exemplo "Desemprego do passado dá lugar a falta de mão-de-obra no têxtil no Vale do Ave".

Acerca dos preços este exemplo "Retreat From Globalization Adds to Inflation Risks":

"While supply-chain disruptions, labor shortages and fiscal stimulus have all been blamed for the rise in short-term inflation, another long-term force could also be at work: “deglobalization.”

Economists and policy makers have long argued that globalization helped to lower prices. As trade barriers fell, domestic companies were forced to compete with cheaper imports. Technology and trade liberalization encouraged  businesses to outsource production to low-wage countries.

...

“The reorganization and shortening of supply chains…will have a cost that will be passed down to the vendors and ultimately to consumers,”"

Onde é que isto nos está a levar?

Primeiro foi a saída da China e o efeito do banhista gordo.

Agora o impacte do Covid-19 na resiliência das cadeias de fornecimento, "Covid-19 Factory Closures Prompt Some U.S. Businesses to Rethink Vietnam":

"Nike, which makes about half of its shoes in Vietnam, said last week it had lost 10 weeks of production there due to plant closures. Those 10 weeks translate to about 100 million pairs of unmanufactured Nike shoes, according to BTIG LLC, an American brokerage firm. Nike now expects demand for its products to exceed available supply over the next eight months.

“Our experience with Covid-related plant closures suggests that reopening and returning to full scale production will take time,” Matt Friend, chief financial officer of Nike, said last week.

...

A survey conducted at the end of August among nearly 100 representatives of companies in the manufacturing sector by the American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam found that a fifth had already transferred part of the production to other countries.

“What people realize, whether it’s China or Vietnam, or whatever, you can’t have all your eggs in one basket, you can’t be vulnerable to a country from a chain perspective. procurement, ”said Jonathan Moreno, head of the House manufacturing and supply chain task force.

...

Andrew Rees, CEO of Crocs Inc., the shoe company, said in mid-September that it was moving some production to other parts of the world. He said the company had already planned to migrate some of its production out of Vietnam and was adding facilities in Indonesia and India. “Continuous diversification is basically the name of the game,” he said."

Onde é que isto nos está a levar?

Que jogo de vasos comunicantes está a ser accionado?

 

Qual o impacte disto?

Há dias citei:

"the word ‘strategy’ derives from the Ancient Greek position of ‘strategos’. The image that the Greeks liked to use to convey the skill of a great strategos was that of the kubernetes – the helmsperson on an inshore fighting ship. The kubernetes’ skill lay in his recognizing that because he could not make waves he had to passively accept the currents, but at the same time he was active working the rudders so as to change direction within the parameters of what was possible."

Ontem publiquei um relato sobre a disrupção nas cadeias de fornecimento.

Hoje, durante a caminhada matinal, li "Shipping chaos gives top importers ‘massive competitive edge’":

"The largest importers are paying far lower freight rates than smaller importers, the playing field is becoming increasingly uneven, and foreign ocean carriers are in position to pick the American import sector’s winners and losers.

“We’re seeing a price differential of $15,000 [per forty-foot equivalent unit or FEU] between the lowest short-term price in the [trans-Pacific] market and the top price,”

...

“That implies a huge competitive advantage for established players, which has consequences across the economy and for everyday life, and also, from a point of view of lowering competition and increasing barriers to entry for future competitors.”

Patrik Berglund, CEO of Xeneta, added, “Everybody’s seeing price increases but … being really big is really a massive competitive edge in this market.”

...

“To put this price differential of $15,000 into context, last year, it was $500.”"

Qual o impacte disto no próximo Natal? 

Qual o impacte disto nos preços para os consumidores? 

Qual o impacte disto no campo de possibilidades para os produtores na proximidade dos centros de consumo?

Como minimizar, ou como aproveitar o dominó de situações gerado por este evento? 

Que realidades podem ser criadas?

Implicações no curto prazo?

Não é só para os brinquedos é para muitas outras coisas.

Os preços do transporte:

"Toy makers currently are playing a high stakes game in which they have to outbid and outmaneuver competitors for shipping containers to get their goods from overseas factories to U.S consumers in time for the holiday season.

In July, the time when toy companies typically start shipping their holiday toys to retailers, prices for shipping containers increased by as much as 500%, according to industry group The Toy Association.

Toy makers say they are being charged $20,000 to $25,000 for 40-foot containers that previously would have cost $3,000 to $4,000."

O espaço nos portos:

"Paying the inflated container costs still doesn’t guarantee toys will be delivered on time, due to backlogs at U.S. ports, railyards, and trucking companies.

“Even if you pay these crazy $20,000, $25,000 prices, there is a delay to get it to you,” said Isaac Larian, CEO of MGA Entertainment, which makes the L.O.L Surprise! and Rainbow High fashion dolls, the Little Tikes outdoor toys, and other playthings. “Once it gets here, there are no truck drivers, no chassis to put the containers on,” Larian said. “Everything that could go wrong has gone wrong at the same time.” 

Os incumbentes e as marcas novas:

"Some manufacturers, Zahn said, have told The Toy Book that they opted to delay releasing new toys this fall because they couldn’t be sure they could get them shipped.

New toy brands “are not even attempting to bring product to market in this environment,”"

Quanto tempo vai isto durar?

"“In terms of when this will normalize, nobody is sure,”" 

Implicações no curto prazo para os fabricantes nacionais?

Trechos retirados de "Shipping Container Crisis Could Derail Holiday Toy Sales"

Imagem retirada daqui.

Peak globalization?

Por um lado:

"It's almost impossible for Partow [Moi ici: A designer] to work remotely. Fashion is a tactile pursuit. She can't do proper fittings by video conference. Patternmakers can't function."(1)

Por outro:

"This is serious business. When Jetro polled 552 of its company members in Thailand last month about their chief coronavirus-related concerns, “the loss of opportunity to attend business meetings” in Thailand and abroad, and new measures affecting travellers such as quarantine came near the top, right after slower sales but above supply challenges.
.
Some futurologists are describing the pandemic as the peak of globalisation, while consultants predict companies will need to shorten and localise their supply chains post-pandemic.
.
McKinsey recently said the “next normal” would spur “a massive restructuring of supply chains” as production and sourcing moved closer to markets."(2)

Veremos marcas europeias e americanas de moda a regressar à produção de proximidade nos países europeus? Ou para a Turquia e Norte de África?

Fonte 1 - Fashion will survive, but many of the designers at the heart of the industry might not
Fonte 2 - Coronavirus threatens to shake up the expat supply chain

O mundo que conhecemos nos últimos 20 anos vai mudar (parte IV)

Parte I e parte II e parte III.

Não é impunemente que se está a passar por este evento.

Definitivamente, o mundo não vai ficar o mesmo. Tal como este evento que estamos a viver representa, em linguagem da química, um delta de Dirac que fez parar bruscamente a economia:

Está em paralelo a acelerar a emergência de uma nova economia. Ontem, chamaram-me a atenção para este grupo no FB - "Coisas Que Imprimem E Outras Que Entopem". Não é impunemente que se criam estas redes de capacidade produtiva, de cumplicidade e partilha de saberes. Não é impunemente que se passa por cima de regulação que protege incumbentes.

Entretanto, para meu espanto, parece que os chineses ainda não perceberam o quanto o mundo mudou "The Second Virus Shockwave Is Hitting China’s Factories Already". Agora, começam a sentir o impacte das decisões de sobrevivência e de bom senso tomadas pela micro-economia: cancelamento de encomendas, recusa em levantar encomendas terminadas.

Depois virá a segunda onda, o impacte das decisões estratégicas das empresas que vão retirar as produção na China e adoptar o que há muito diziam, mas demoravam a implementar, unidades produtivas por bloco económico.

Depois virá a terceira onda, o impacte das decisões políticas dos blocos económicos para evitarem futura dependência do gigante asiático.

Para reflexão

Ontem o Filipe Garcia publicou um gráfico que contribui e muito para a compreensão das alterações em curso na Europa e que tenho acompanhado em:

• À atenção do ministro da Economia;
• O tempo que agora vivemos
• Nunca esquecer esta longa série de cromos
• "Se a conjuntura explicasse tudo, a aceleração não seria apenas em Portugal"

Agora comparem os salários portugueses com os daquela facha dos Cárpatos até ao Báltico:

Acerca do reshoring

Uma tendência que adivinhámos aqui há muitos anos: reshoring.

Fonte "US and Italy take lead in repatriating manufacturing":

"Above all, firms are reshoring production centres that had been outsourced to China. European companies are also returning from the Far East,
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Reasons for returning
The cost of labour – frequently the only criterion taken into account when offshoring production – is also on the rise in countries far away from the parent company, increasing by up to 15% a year in China, for example. Savings on labour are no longer offsetting higher logistics and customs costs.
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At the same time, consumers are more demanding. Closer proximity to production facilities allows greater quality control, better links between R&D and production divisions, faster delivery times, prompt customer support and an increasingly important factor – flaunting the “Made in...” label." [Moi ici: O poder da interacção, a vantagem competitiva dos humanos]

Fonte "Reshoring Exceeded Offshoring in 2016":

"a variety of issues affecting reshoring. Here are some highlights:
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• Proximity to customers was the leading factor in 2016, followed by government incentives, skilled workforce availability and ecosystem synergies."

"Se a conjuntura explicasse tudo, a aceleração não seria apenas em Portugal" (parte II)

Como é que terminei a parte I?

"O efeito do fim da China como fábrica do mundo."

Entretanto, ontem descobri este texto "O aprovisionamento de proximidade". Recomendo a sua leitura para ter uma percepção da revolução em curso na Europa de Leste à custa do fim da China como fábrica do mundo. Portugal também está a aproveitar esta maré.

Segundo o ministro da Economia há uma aceleração do crescimento do PIB em Portugal (só em Portugal) mas ao ler este texto é impossível não imaginar a revolução em curso no outro extremo geográfico da Europa.

Basta recordar o efeito do banhista gordo. A China tem mais de mil milhões de habitantes. A Europa em 2010, segundo a ONU, tinha 740 milhões de habitantes.

Há anos que relacionamos reshoring, nearshoring e o fim da China como fábrica do mundo.

Em curso o fim da globalização

Outro sintoma do refluxo da globalização, do reshoring, do fim da China como fábrica do mundo, do advento de Mongo e do aumento da importância da proximidade, da co-criação, da interacção, da preferência, "Eurozone Manufacturing Adds Jobs at Fastest Pace in 20 Years":

"The eurozone’s economic recovery maintained its recent, stronger momentum in May as the currency area’s manufacturing sector added jobs at the fastest pace in 20 years while German businesses were more optimistic than at any time since 1991."