Melhorar as hipóteses de execução

Um texto interessante e a merecer reflexão, "Is Execution Where Good Strategies Go to Die?"

"what determines whether execution brings life or death to your strategy? It’s not what you think. It’s how you think. The mental models that inform strategy are usually different from those that determine implementation. To close the strategy-execution gap, leaders have to close several other, smaller gaps.
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First, the thinking styles of the people who create strategy are often different from those of the people who implement it.
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strategy is usually developed by people who have a big-picture orientation, while execution is often done by those with a detail orientation. Furthermore, strategy is usually done by people who are focused on ideas and connections, while implementation is done by those who focus on process and action.
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The second gap is a result of the connection between participation and ownership. ... Often stakeholders are kept out of the strategy process out of concern that they will slow things down or compromise the quality of the outcome. But this is a shortsighted view. By involving stakeholders earlier, you give them a sense of ownership that speeds things up when it comes time for execution. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that diversity will actually improve the quality of the strategy. And it’s far more likely the strategy will stick to its flight plan, because those responsible for its execution will have a stake in defending it.
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The third gap between strategy and execution is in the narrative around the strategy. The strategy itself may be sound, but what matters for execution isn’t what is said but what is heard. Strategy is inherently about creating something new or getting somewhere new. But the way humans are wired, it’s difficult to process something that is completely unrelated to what we already know. A good narrative helps people move from the past to the future.
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The fourth gap between strategy and execution is in measurement and metrics. [Moi ici: Isto para um praticante e adepto do balanced scorecard não tem espinhas ...] This, too, is a reflection of mental models. You only measure what you can see. And your mental models determine what is visible or invisible. I consistently see measurement as an afterthought in strategy development. The assumption is that financial measures like cost and revenue are sufficient metrics to measure progress. But that would be like a coach only tracking points on the scoreboard. You need metrics that tell you how well your game plan is being executed — metrics that all of your players can organize around.
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Execution doesn’t have to be the place good strategies go to die. As you are developing your strategy, take into account the thinking styles and mental models of the people who will be responsible for its execution. Involve them to generate a sense of ownership and to tap into their collective wisdom. Craft a narrative that connects the past to the future. And design metrics that focus attention and motivate behavior around what will really make the strategy successful."

Heterogeneidade da procura e idiossincrasia da oferta

A propósito da minha paixão pela heterogeneidade da procura e pela idiossincrasia das empresas:

"Demand heterogeneity...
The degree of heterogeneity in consumer preferences is characterized by the extent to which customers differ in their preference orderings and budget constraints, which in turn determines the extent to which more than one offer can succeed in a given market.
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we may observe some heterogeneity among these consumers with regards to budget constraints and performance requirements. This explains why some customers prefer high-end to low-end products derived from the old technology. The rise of a new dominant technology does not change these relationships—consumers in the home market still prefer the old technology to the previous alternatives, and still have the same heterogeneity in budget and performance requirements.
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Revealing latent heterogeneity
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Although the new technology does not itself change consumers’ preferences, its very emergence can act to reveal previously hidden differences in consumers’ preferences.
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heterogeneity is revealed by differences in observed choices. Choices, in turn, are bounded by choice sets. When a new technology offers a new attribute bundle, it presents consumers with new couplings and de-couplings of attributes. This expands the choice set in which consumer preferences can be observed and the dimensions along which heterogeneity can be parsed, which, in turn, can be used to identify new niches within the existing market.
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Retrenching in a revealed niche
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Losing the mainstream of the market need not be a signal of the impending loss of the entirety of the market.
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While it is possible that all consumers in the market uniformly prefer the new technology to the old, there are several drivers of variance that may lead parts of the market to continue to prefer the old technology to the new. This variance can be rooted in budget constraints, such that some consumers may prefer the new technology on a pure performance basis, but nonetheless choose the old technology on a price/performance basis
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By revealing latent heterogeneity in the market, the introduction of the new technology exposes new lines of segmentation—niche opportunities within a market that previously had been regarded as homogenous. Within these niches, the old technology can maintain a sustainable advantage over the new technology. Exploiting this heterogeneity, however, entails redefining the size and composition of the market, and retrenching into the revealed niche.
It also entails a complete inversion of strategic imperatives: for racing firms, the key question is: “What new attributes and performance does the new technology address, and how can I make up for it to maintain relevance in the market?” For retrenching firms, the key question is: “What old attributes and performance did the new technology reveal by not addressing them, and how can I exploit this to create a sustainable niche?”"

Trechos retirados de "Old technology responses to new technology threats: demand heterogeneity and technology retreats" de Ron Adner e Daniel Snow, publicado em 2010 por Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 19, Number 5, pp. 1655–1675

Mais do que eventos

"In his book Out of the Crisis, W. Edwards Deming wrote: “A fault in the interpretation of observations, seen everywhere, is to suppose that every event (defect, mistake, accident) is attributable to someone (usually the one nearest at hand), or is related to some special event. The fact is that most troubles with service and production lie in the system.”
“We shall speak of faults of the system as common causes of trouble, and faults from fleeting events as special causes,” he wrote. “Confusion between common causes and special causes leads to frustration of everyone, and leads to greater variability and higher costs, exactly contrary to what is needed. I should estimate that in my experience most troubles and most possibilities for improvement add up to proportions something like this: 94% belong to the system (responsibility of management), 6% special.”
Control charts offer the study of variation and its source over time."

Que bom voltar a encontrar este trecho do grande Deming. Vejo tão pouca gente fora da indústria automóvel a usar o poder das cartas de controlo...

Vejo tão pouca gente fora da indústria automóvel a olhar para lá da camada superficial dos eventos e a mergulhar nos comportamentos e no sistema.

Não há acasos!

Por cá, o fragilismo faz o seu percurso natural, "E se Centeno não for tão bom a baixar o défice como parece?". Basta ler este trecho:

"O ministro das Finanças argumenta que os mercados validam a sua estratégia."

Entretanto, esta semana já li:

• Alemanha está a preparar queda da Europa, segundo cronista do Guardian (não se iludam com o título, se calhar maldosamente plantado - o que faz um país não fragilista? Faz cenários e testa a sua robustez e procura minimizar riscos)
• Germany’s Economic Strength Lays Ground for Reforms, Says Advisers 

Só temos as consequências do que fazemos, não há acasos!

Deixar de ser Vítima (coitadinho)

Quantas vezes ao longo dos anos escrevi aqui sobre o locus de controlo interno e externo?

Ontem encontrei este texto, "Are You a Victim or a Transformer?"

"changing our mindset from ‘Victim’ to ‘Transformer’. With the Victim mindset “we give in to the constraint and the only option is to scale back our ambition”. When we are in Neutraliser mode, “we start to see ways around our targets – looking for workarounds or shortcuts”. However, it is only with a Transformer mindset that, in the words of Morgan and Franco, we begin to see any constraint as “pregnant with opportunity… a springboard for a new way to deliver our ambition”. Therefore what becomes both important and useful for leaders to understand is where their teams sit on the Victim-to-Transformer axis when confronted by thorny challenges.
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[Moi ici: A seguir, um pouco de esperança] The Victim mentality is not necessarily a personality trait, or something fixed in stone forever. Typically, we go on a journey from left to right. The natural reaction when faced by a constraint is to feel ‘victimised’, but whether you then progress to the status of Neutraliser and Transformer will partly depend on your appetite for battle."

Cuidado com as cópias

Para os que se sentem tentados a seguir o canto das sereias e acham que as palavras de um anónimo da província não são de confiar:

"Agora imaginem PME a tentarem copiar as actuações estratégicas de empresas grandes porque aparecem nas revistas, nos jornais, porque são comentadas, porque ..."

Ou ainda: "lab or a factory"; "Guterres e a tralha salazarista: reflexão para as PMEs" e "Pensamento contrário".

Recomendo a leitura de "Don’t be fooled by success":

"Imitating successful competitors can be surprisingly misleading and ineffective
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The most successful firms in your industry probably just got lucky
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Focusing on short-term wins can have negative long-term effects years later"

Web Summit? Contrarian

Quem haveria de dizer!!!

Um velho tema deste blogue, quando o mundo muda, talvez a solução para uma PME não passe por ir atrás mas por mudar de mercado. Recordar:

• Têxteis produzidos em países de mão-de-obra cara (Julho de 2011)
• Mais duendes (Abril de 2014)
• Para reflexão (Abril de 2015)
• Estratégia e pontos fortes, o ovo ou a galinha (Setembro de 2015)
• Subir na escala da abstracção (parte II) (Dezembro de 2015)
• Ofertas antigas e mercados novos (Julho de 2016)

Li "Old technology responses to new technology threats: demand heterogeneity and technology retreats" de Ron Adner e Daniel Snow, publicado em 2010 por Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 19, Number 5, pp. 1655–1675 e sublinhei:

"We explore the implications of a real and common alternative to attempting the transformation required to embrace a new, dominant, technology—the choice to maintain focus on the old technology. In considering this choice, we distinguish between “racing” strategies, which attempt to fight off the rise of the new technology by extending the performance of the old technology, and “retreat” strategies, which attempt to accommodate the rise of the new technology by repositioning the old technology in the demand environment. [Moi ici: O nosso clássico exemplo da artesã de Bragança] Underlying our arguments is the observation that the emergence of a new technology does more than just create a substitute threat—it can also reveal significant underlying heterogeneity in the old technology’s broader demand environment. This heterogeneity is a source of opportunities that can support a new position for the old technology, in either the current market or a new one. Using this lens, we explore the decision to stay with the old technology as a rational, proactive choice rather than as a mark of managerial and organizational failure.
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Implicit in many studies, and explicit in many others, is the assumption that the “correct” incumbent response to technological change is to embrace its inevitability. Much of the literature has focused on the timing and means by which firms make the jump from the old technology to the new.
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In reality, the economy is full of firms that soldier on with an old technology long after the rise of a dominant substitute. Pagers persist today as messaging devices for emergency services, long after the arrival of mobile phones. Audio tape sales have not been eliminated by the rise of the compact disc. Semiconductor manufacturing technologies three and four generations behind the frontier continue to be purchased and used.
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In this article, we explore the implications of a real and common alternative to attempting the transformation required to embrace a new, dominant, technology— the choice to maintain a focus on the old technology. In considering this choice, we distinguish between “racing” strategies, which attempt to fight off the rise of the new technology by extending the performance of the old technology, and two distinct “retreat” strategies, which attempt to accommodate the rise of the new technology by repositioning the old technology in the demand environment, either by retrenching into a niche position within the old technology’s home market, or by relocating the old technology into a new market application. Underlying our arguments is the observation that the emergence of a new technology does more than just create a substitute threat—it can also reveal significant underlying heterogeneity in the old technology’s broader demand environment. Exploiting this revealed heterogeneity can allow the firm to create a new, more sustainable, position for the old technology in the face of competition from the new technology.
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We explore the decision to stay with the old technology as a rational, proactive choice rather than as a mark of managerial and organizational failure. To be clear, we do not suggest that foregoing the new should be regarded as the dominant strategy for dealing with technological change. We do, however, argue that it is often a viable though neglected option, and hence merits explicit consideration."

"estamos na eterna repetição do mesmo"

“To deal with reality you must first recognize it as such.”

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) November 7, 2017

"Quando partidos que não querem mudar se prestam a ser apoios de partidos que não podem mudar, forma-se uma plataforma política incongruente: pode ocupar o poder, mas não pode governar, pode esconder o passado, mas não pode reformar o presente e clarificar o futuro. Há partidos que gostariam de mudar, mas não sabem como, porque as questões que terão para resolver quando voltarem ao poder serão as mesmas (ou mais graves) que enfrentaram quando estiveram no poder.
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tem de se reconhecer que não se aprendeu nada e não se esqueceu nada - estamos na eterna repetição do mesmo."

Trechos retirados de "Não aprender nem esquecer"

Mongo em crescendo

Em dois ou três dias apenas:

• "Taylor Swift, iOS, and the Access Economy: Why the Normal Distribution is Vanishing" referido em Sobre o fim da distribuição normal e o advento de Mongo
• The Longer Tail: The Changing Shape of Amazon’s Sales Distribution Curve
• Build For The Few And Not The Many

Mongo em crescendo.

Quantificar valor

Hoje, ao ler o capítulo "Salesforce confidence and proficiency - The chief cornerstone of effective customer value management" de Gary Kleiner (incluído em "Value First then Price: Quantifying value in Business to Business markets", editado por Andreas Hinterhuber e Todd Snelgrove), comecei logo a pensar no caso particular de uma empresa que conheço.

A empresa presta um serviço aos seus clientes pelos quais cobra um preço. Entretanto, uma multinacional apareceu a financiar uma empresa concorrente que, para crescer rapidamente, faz uns preços ultra-competitivos. No último ano a empresa perdeu alguns dos seus clientes mais antigos por causa do diferencial de preço.

O que Gary Kleiner me fez foi pensar numa forma da empresa listar toda uma série de benesses que dá aos seus clientes e que não são quantificadas e traduzidas em valor que o cliente experimenta:

• pequenos serviços que a empresa presta aos seus clientes e não cobra nem quantifica, nem mantém contabilidade;
• serviços fora de horas que a empresa presta para ajudar clientes em apuros;
• serviços super-rápidos que a empresa presta para ajudar clientes em apuros;
• ...

Vou propor à empresa que crie uma tabela para registar todas as benesses que dá aos seus clientes, e que junto dos seus clientes mais leais procure quantificar o retorno o quanto vale um serviço feito às 2h da manhã (quando a empresa fecha às 18h), para que o cliente consiga expedir o produto para o seu cliente antes que o prazo termine.

Quantas empresas não estarão na mesma circunstância, prestam serviços que não quantificam nem traduzem em valor. Assim, quando um concorrente aparece a propor um preço mais baixo, ou a empresa baixa também ou perde-o.

o vector tempo não é irrelevante (parte III)

Na parte II sublinhámos:

"the conviction that the coarse structure of the economy can exhibit no regularities that are not results of the fine structure, and that those aggregates or mean values, which alone can be grasped statistically, give us no information about what takes place in the fine structure."

Sou um acompanhante e promotor da idiossincrasia das empresas como grande factor competitivo. Por isso, apreciei muito estes trechos:

"Competitive  advantages  and  superior  resource positions are the outcome of an idiosyncratic and path-dependent process. In the extant literature scholars have argued that this path is both enabled and  constrained by firms’ knowledge and capabilities. Our arguments suggest that superior market positions and superior resource complementarities may also act as self-reinforcing mechanisms that shape a firm’s evolutionary path and may amplify differences in competitive positions (at least in the absence of discontinuous environmental change).
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ultimately, it is managers that must make decisions about acquiring or building resources. Managerial judgment concerning the value creation potential of a resource and the factors that enable and constrain it are key factors in determining what resources a firm acquires or builds and, thus, what path toward a distinct competitive position it takes
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Arriving at a position of competitive advantage often requires the orchestration of complex resource acquisition, development, and disposal strategies consistently over an extended period of time. We can depict managers as using the mechanisms of superior market position, superior resource complementarities, and superior network position strategically to turn initial asymmetries to their advantage through a set of resource orchestration decisions that evolve and unfold over time. Managers can shape their firm’s resource base in a way that allows for competitive improvement at a later stage—for example, through anticipating future market positions or future complementarities and through acquiring at an early stage some of the resources that are needed for building a market position later..These resources will not be as valuable unless the firm successfully acquires or builds other complementary resources in the future. Such a strategy may be particularly beneficial when resources take time to develop..Our arguments suggest that, under uncertainty, resource value is subjective and at least partly depends on the identity and characteristics of managers. Given their unique knowledge and experience, managers differ in terms of how much value they attribute to a resource and, subsequently, how much value they are able to create with a resource.…our results highlight the role of value creation in strategic management theory, as opposed to value capture, which depicts strategy as a zero-sum game, where the gain of one is the loss of the other. Value capture implies a focus on bargaining and pricing but neglects demand-side opportunities and taking into account or even influencing what customers are willing to pay. Considering value creation opens up new perspectives on demand-side opportunities that firms are able to exploit—for example, through diversification. Recently, both in the marketing literature and the strategy literature scholars have suggested that attention to how customers perceive value, how value is created from using products, and how firms are able to boost customers’ willingness to pay are key contributors to firm performance. Strategies aimed at increasing value creation by taking into account demand-side factors, as well as aimed at shaping such factors, are central to strategic management (and not only to marketing) but are very much an understudied topic..Furthermore, the demand side entails an opportunity space that allows firms to establish, enhance, or retain the value of their resources. Understanding the environment, particularly customer preferences, allows firms to acquire or build those resources or extract those services from resources that generate the most value for customers."

Trechos retirados de "What Makes a Resource Valuable? Identifying the Drivers of Firm-Idiosyncratic Resource Value" de Jens Schmidt e Thomas Keil, publicado por  Academy of Management Review, 2013, Vol. 38, No. 2, 206–228

Do abstract retiro:

"We further emphasize how the role of demand-side factors, [Moi ici: Heterogeneidade da procura] as well as the understanding and active shaping of such factors by managers, is a source of heterogeneity in firms’ resource endowments. [Moi ici: Heterogeneidade de recursos] Thus, our results show how two  understudied  areas  in  strategic  management—the  role  of  managers  in  resource  management and the role of the demand side as an opportunity space — can  be  fruitfully  combined  to  gain new insights into how firms achieve positions of competitive  advantage."

Exemplo para partes interessadas relevantes

Quando as pessoas me dizem que não sabem como aplicar a cláusula 4.2 da ISO 9001:2015 procuro ter à mão exemplos como este, "TMG Automotive: tecnologia e qualidade de mãos dadas".

Primeiro, a proposta de valor:

“Os nossos concorrentes são todos fora de Portugal. O nosso maior concorrente é um grupo alemão, muito, muito grande com uma quota de mercado de 40%”, afirma Isabel Furtado.
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Para a gestora não há dúvida: “A nossa vantagem face a eles é que somos mais flexíveis, talvez mais inovadores em muitos aspetos, mas temos o problema de sermos periféricos, não só face ao centro de decisão que está na Alemanha, mas também em termos de distância, uma vez que as matérias-primas vêm do centro da Europa”

Sublinhados do artigo e que podem ser relacionados com a cláusula 4.2:

"A falta de engenheiros a saírem das Universidades
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o nosso maior problema são algumas engenharias como polímeros de materiais e têxtil.
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confirma essa ligação a que acrescenta ainda a Universidade do Porto. “Ministramos os estágios dessas faculdades aos alunos dos mestrados”. A gestora fala ainda na proximidade, a mesma que invoca para justificar a grande proximidade que têm com os centros tecnológicos. “Temos que pensar que os detentores de conhecimento são os centros tecnológicos"

Partes interessadas relevantes:

• Internas - engenheiros;
• Externas - Universidade do Porto; Centros Tecnológicos 

Como trabalhei nesta empresa há muitos anos ouso acrescentar às partes interessantes externas relevantes alguns fornecedores: os de PVC; os de estabilizantes térmicos, os de plastificantes e agentes expansores.

Que actividades, que processos a empresa desenvolve de forma planeada, sistemática, para obter que resultados, em troca de que recursos e resultados para essas partes interessadas?

Preço e contexto

Há tempos conversei com o director comercial de multinacional que está a desenvolver uma estratégia omnicanal. Uma das suas preocupações era assegurar que todos os clientes acordassem em chegar ao consumidor com um mesmo preço, independentemente de ser via retalho ou comércio electrónico.

"Should brick-and-mortar retailers set different prices in-store and online? If Amazon (or another web retailer) is not significantly stealing business away, it doesn’t make sense to slash online prices. Best to accept the minimal customer loss, maintain current prices, and be thankful.
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However, if a web retailer is successfully poaching a sizable number of customers, it’s time to reconsider whether having identical online and in-store prices makes sense. Making this decision gets at the pricing dilemma faced by many brick and mortar retailers: If a company sets rock-bottom prices in order to compete against internet rivals, it will lose money on in-store purchases due to the store’s higher costs (employees, high rent locations, etc.). But if prices are set at what’s profitable for in-store purchases, web prices won’t be competitive. A one-price-fits-all-channels mandate can result in a disadvantage in one market.
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Retailers should view their online and in-store channels as unique services, much like gas stations offering self-service and full-service options. Relatively higher prices can capture the premium that some customers place on purchasing in-store. Web prices can be lower to compete against aggressive e-tailers.
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Will discount web prices mean that everyone will purchase online? No. Many people choose to purchase in stores and pay premiums even though they can order from Amazon. In the third quarter of 2016, e-commerce accounted for 7.7% of all retail sales."

Imagino que o preço que a multinacional está a propor aos clientes do retalho físico permite que estes ganhem dinheiro e, por isso, permite que os que vendem online tenham retornos muito interessantes. E isso não criará uma janela de oportunidade para que produtores concorrentes, dedicados a servir a distribuição online, possam oferecer produtos semelhantes que podem ser vendidos a preços mais baixos?

Até que ponto a marca da multinacional consegue servir de barreira? Ou, até que ponto a multinacional deve criar marcas diferentes, com preços diferentes, para cada tipo de canal?

A multinacional pode ver o seu produto como único mas o cliente está perante um contexto diferente, e o preço é contexual:

"To succeed in the modern world of retail, executives need to embrace web and in-store as unique operations that cater to customers with different needs and price sensitivities"

Trechos retirados de "How Retailers Should Think About Online Versus In-Store Pricing"

Ainda acerca de começar pelo fim

Ontem ao recordar "Mais um monumento à treta - parte II" reli:

"Se ainda não leram o Plano, óptimo, porque é assim mesmo na vida real (ou deveria ser assim). Antes de investirmos um nano-segundo que seja no desenvolvimento, na criação do conteúdo do plano, devemos começar por definir o ponto de chegada.
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Começar pelo fim!!! Onde queremos chegar?" 

E pensei, puxar versus empurrar. Já escrevi sobre isso...


Setembro de 2006, "Puxar, não empurrar"

BTW, "Relative Effects of Forward and Backward Planning on Goal Pursuit":

"Across five studies using various planning paradigms, we demonstrated that backward planning leads to greater motivation and better goal-directed behavior than does forward planning. Furthermore, relative to forward planning, backward planning allows people to more clearly anticipate the necessary steps and follow the original plan to reach the set goal; backward planning also leads to higher goal expectancy and less time pressure when coordinating the steps required to accomplish the goal is complex.
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A recent study also examined order of planning and found that (relative to forward  planning) backward planning allows people to clarify important steps as well as potential obstacles to goal achievement. At first glance, the anticipation of obstacles in backward planning appears to contradict our finding that backward planning leads to higher goal expectancy and less time pressure. However, we expect that, in line with fantasy-realization theory, backward planning allows a clear view of essential steps, including obstacles, and effective management of goal pursuit, ultimately leading to higher goal expectancy and lesser time pressure than an unclear view predicted in forward planning.
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A  variety  of  goals,  such  as  academic  degrees,  career choices, and financial planning, require complex plans to accomplish. Our findings indicate that planning in reverse chronological order may not only help people have a clearer view of tasks to execute but also improve their actual performance."

Grande lição que aprendi com Stephen Covey em "The seven habits of highly effective people", "Begin with the end in mind"

Acerca da execução estratégica

Algumas dicas sobre o que pode contribuir para uma execução estratégica bem sucedida:

"Putting strategy into practice is notoriously difficult. In our experience, the primary obstacle to strategy execution is a failure to balance the inherent tensions that characterize any major execution effort. Successful strategy execution calls for skillful orchestration of sometimes opposing forces and competing needs. In particular, there are four core tensions that leaders need to balance.
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Tension #1: An inspiring end-state versus challenging targets.
A vision of an inspirational ”end state” is essential for getting people to commitment to change: a simple narrative that articulates not only why change is necessary but also what life will look and feel like once change is successfully implemented.
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Tension #2: Top-down control versus democratization of change.
When everyone in the organization feels empowered to make decisions that can influence change, it creates a palpable energy: People tend to work harder, offer more ideas, and become far more invested in the process. If every activity is the result of a command from on high, the company runs the risk of sucking all the energy out of the room. But the flip side can be myriad groups of enthusiastic change agents dashing off in multiple, uncoordinated directions.
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Tension #3: Capability development versus pressure for results.
Many strategies call for significant changes in the ways a company works, which raises questions of whether the organization needs to develop new capabilities. But the pressure to deliver immediate results is often so intense that an organization may be forced to forge ahead with its existing capabilities.
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Tension #4: Creativity versus discipline.
Creativity is a part of any distinctive strategy. Fearing that discipline will stifle creativity, it is not uncommon for executives to choose to “let the creatives run free.” At its best this can lead to unanticipated insights and outcomes, but at its worst it can lead to chaos and complete unaccountability for results. In fact, creativity and discipline are not mutually exclusive — yet this tension can be the hardest one to balance.
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Getting strategy done well often calls for trade-offs between delivering short-term results and implementing foundational changes that require time. Yet companies that can achieve a balance between opposing forces are far more likely to realize successful strategies that endure."

Trechos retirados de "Good Strategy Execution Requires Balancing 4 Tensions"

Recordar um monumento à treta

No final do congresso ou reunião em que o actual primeiro ministro foi nomeado líder do partido, uma  actriz fez uma declamação sobre vítimas da violência doméstica. Desde então o número de vítimas da violência doméstica não parece que tenha diminuído.

Sempre que o tema é aflorado recordo um texto que escrevi em Junho de 2007, "Mais um monumento à treta - parte II" e que deve continuar tão ou mais actual que nunca.

"despertar o interesse da gestão de topo nesta coisa menorizada"

A chegar às ultimas sessões de uma formação de longa duração sobre auditorias internas vou deixar um desafio para os futuros auditores.

Regras clássicas a seguir para redigir uma não conformidade:

• Ser uma constatação negativa. Algo está errado!
• É uma violação de um requisito. Uma qualquer promessa feita num dos documentos do sistema de gestão, ou exigida pelo referencial, não foi cumprida.

Além destas duas regras vou propor uma terceira:

• Ser significativa. Deve de algum modo relacionar-se com valores importantes para o negócio e mostrar como os afecta de um modo negativo.

Esta última regra pode ser referida como:

Mais uma forma de tentar dar o salto da conformidade para o desempenho:

Descrição da não-conformidade segundo as duas primeiras regras:

Evidenciado Plano de Manutenção Preventiva previsto na ficha de processo 4.1 versão 3. 

No entanto, a empresa não evidenciou registos do seu cumprimento em 2017.

Como usar a terceira regra?

Qual a consequência de não se realizar a manutenção preventiva? 

Ocorrem avarias!

Quais as consequências potenciais dessas avarias?

• Custo de reparação
• Tempo de paragem
• Custo de não produção
• Quantidades não produzidas
• Horas-extra para recuperar tempo perdido
• Menos anos de vida-útil
• Perda de características
• ...

Entre a realização da auditoria da auditoria interna e a entrega do relatório, o auditor pode pedir ou pesquisar informação sobre avarias, custo de avarias, tempos de paragem, horas-extra, ... pode solicitar a informação à Qualidade, ou Manutenção, ou Produção, ou Controlo de Gestão, ou Contabilidade, ou Recursos Humanos, ou ... 

Ao redigir a versão final da não-conformidade o auditor pode juntar 3 peças:

Evidenciado Plano de Manutenção Preventiva previsto na ficha de processo 4.1 versão 3. 

No entanto, a empresa não evidenciou registos do seu cumprimento em 2017. Entretanto, nos primeiros 7 meses deste ano os custos com avarias cresceram 20% e, os tempos de paragem por avaria cresceram 15%. 

Uma não-conformidade escrita desta maneira é capaz de despertar o interesse da gestão de topo nesta coisa menorizada que são as auditorias internas.

Os dias pacatos que antecedem o quadragésimo oitavo dia

Vivemos aqueles dias pacatos que antecedem o quadragésimo oitavo dia:

"It's already been a terrible year for traditional retailers.
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Thus far, the industry has announced plans to close 6,700 stores this year, more than any other year on record, and there's still two months left in 2017.
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It's clear what's driving this shake-up. The rise of e-commerce is making brick-and-mortar stores less appealing, and mall traffic has subsequently declined, pressuring even strong companies.
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Nike ... more than two thirds of growth is expected to come from the digital channel during that time.
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More importantly, Nike announced a massive revamp of its wholesale strategy, which includes emphasizing just 40 retailers out of the current 30,000 retailers it distributes to.
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 "undifferentiated, mediocre retail won't survive," adding, "We will be shifting away from this over the next five years."
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It's clear now that the company's focus will be on the digital sales channel and premium in-store experiences like the ones above. Simply distributing sneakers to stores is no longer a priority. The internet makes those access points unnecessary.
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The old industry saying, "Pile 'em high and watch 'em fly," no longer plays. Retailers who want to survive will need to heed suppliers' wishes and become more experience-focused. In the digital age, the storefront, that once-crucial middleman, is no longer necessary. As Nike's Edwards said, some retailers will inevitably get left behind.
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If 2017 was a bonfire for the retail sector, the coming years could turn it into a full-fledged inferno." 

O artigo é sobre a Nike, o artigo é sobre o comércio tradicional, o artigo é sobre as fábricas que produzem bens.

Por um lado as ameaças que se adivinham com esta revolução. Por outro lado as oportunidades que se podem desenhar e materializar com esta revolução.

Sem pensamento estratégico as ameaças ganham, com pensamento estratégico talvez se encontrem alternativas. E se os clientes das fábricas portugueses não tiverem pensamento estratégico de nada lhes adiantará ter o seu próprio pensamento se não arranjarem parcerias alternativas.

Recordar esta reflexão recente.


Trechos retirados de "Nike's plan to survive the retail apocalypse could destroy mediocre stores"

Para reflexão

Imagem retirada daqui.

"Real and meaningful value is less about what you do and more about what the customer receives"

"Real and meaningful value is less about what you do and more about what the customer receives. [Moi ici: Feels, experience, recognize] Many sellers feel that value is what they do or provide to the customer; however, that's only a small part of the overall equation. There is both a science and an art to value-added documentation. The science component includes those things provided that have commercial billable value—such as an emergency after-hours delivery from local inventory. At the minimum, the seller should document billable services, support, and items provided to the customer at no or a reduced charge. This is the easy part and the equivalent of swimming in the shallow end of the pool. The pitfall of only documenting items of this nature is that the customer can easily rebut them by saying "this is your job," "this is what we expect" or "you competitor can do the same thing." The art of value-added documentation and communication is identifying what the customer received as a result of your efforts. Typically what the customer receives is worth many times more than what you provided. Let's use the example of an emergency after-hours delivery from location inventory. If you waived the call-out charge and subsequently developed a value-added document for what you did (the science), the document would show $250 in cost avoidance. However, as a result of your responsiveness, that after-hours delivery of critical components may have reduced two hours of unscheduled downtime at $5,000 per hour. The "science" side of your documentation is worth $250, but the "art" provided them $10,000 in value. When you understand and communicate the "art" of your value, you are now in an area where many customers cannot compare you with the competition. They can refute those items of your job that you quantify, but they are hard pressed to dismiss the benefits they received from you performing your job with a high degree of efficiency and precision."

Trechos retirados de "Value First then Price: Quantifying value in Business to Business markets", editado por Andreas Hinterhuber e Todd Snelgrove.